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Abstract 
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-
haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has 
been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context. Subse-
quently, many-player games, and specifically global games (where payoffs depend 
collectively on all the rest of the players) as with the minimal game, have been 
studied. The minority game is attractive because it has intuitive similarities to e.g. 
securing niche businesses. We enhance this intuitive similarity by extending the 
game through the introduction of delayed payoffs. Payoffs depend on the values of 
future moves; we reward choices which later on become popular.  
 
We study agents’ moves in such global game with delayed payoff. Instead of an 
evolutionary approach we allow learning in the agents. We study strategies that 
may emerge through learning in agents in such games. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
From a physics viewpoint, dynamical systems can be understood to behave as-
ymptotically in three ways described by point attractors, cyclic attractors and 
strange attractors. Economic ensembles, having large numbers of degrees of free-
dom, and probably nonlinear interactions, are dynamical systems. Classical eco-
nomics can be associated with point attractors, while phenomena like business and 
economic cycles can perhaps be seen as manifestations of cyclic attractors. Of cur-
rent interest is the regime of strange attractors, where complex dynamics can ei-
ther produce virtually random trajectories or complex trajectories with fractal 
characteristics. 
 
The study of the complex dynamics of economic ensembles consisting of inter-
acting agents whose behaviors are described in terms of games, has been initiated 
through the application of the evolutionary paradigm to the two-person prisoners’ 
dilemma game [1]. Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of many in-
teracting agents playing games, suggesting the use of many-player games. There 
have been studies [5] of many-player prisoners’ dilemma, but prisoners’ dilemma 
being inherently two-player, each player here interacts only with his immediate 
neighbors. From the physics point of view, elements in the network interact only 
first-order and/or locally. One interesting many-player game studied is the minor-
ity game [2] where payoffs depend on the actions of all other players, thus yield-
ing a network with higher-order or global interactions. The minority game is at-
tractive because it has intuitive similarities to e.g. securing niche businesses. 
 
In this paper, we introduce a new class of games, in which in addition to having 
global interactions, payoffs are delayed in the sense that they depend on the values 
of the players’ future moves. In particular, subscribing to some economic intui-
tion, we design payoffs in such a way that we reward (near-) minority choices 
which later on become popular. We study agents’ or players’ long-time moves in 
such a game. We use learning agents instead of evolutionary ones and we vary the 
amount of information available from which the agents can learn. We also explore 
the effect of culture, understood as direct transmission of knowledge between 
agents. 
2 THE MODEL 
N players or agents k each chooses one of n options i. If ik(t) is k’s choice at 
timestep t, then payoffs pi for moves i at t is taken to be 
pi(t) = ∑k δ(i,ik(t+1)) - ∑k δ(i,ik(t)) (1) 
where the Kronecker delta δ(x,y) = 1 when x = y and 0 otherwise. 
  
Agents learn using a neural network without hidden units, by employing a vari-
ant of the back-propagation algorithm [6], or equivalently, Hebbian learning with 
nonlinearity. For an input u contributing to the output ik(t), the synaptic strength 
Tkui between them changes by 
∆Tkui = η( pi - hki) f'(hki) + χι (2) 
where η is the learning rate, hki is the field for the neuron representing ik,    
hki = Σu  Tkui u, (3) 
f'(x) is the differential of the neuron transfer function (the nonlinearity), taken to 
be  
f'(x)  = 1/(x2+1), (4) 
and χ is a ‘creativity’ factor incorporating ‘noise’ or some ‘non-zero temperature’ 
effects via the random number ι picked from a uniform random distribution be-
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tween 0 and 1. Initial synaptic values are small random numbers equally likely to 
be positive or negative. Without learning (η = 0), option choices are random.  
 
Agents decide on options through a competitive network [4] involving the final 
layer neurons; in particular, the agent k chooses the option I if hkI = max({hki }i). 
We further defined the memory M of agents as the number of timesteps back that 
they remember of payoffs and moves. Cases where M = 0 then are equivalent to 
random choices. 
 
Inputs u to the field for decision and to the learning may consist only of each 
respective agent’s own previous moves (‘self learning’). A more plausible sce-
nario is where u also include previous resulting payoffs (‘learning with payoff’), 
and with information, there is also the case where in addition to these, the previous 
moves of other agents contribute to the decision-making and the learning (‘learn-
ing with information’). A model of culture is also explored where there is a direct 
contribution to the ‘knowledge’ stored in an agent’s synapses from those of the 
others: 
Tkui := ε (∑ k’≠ k  Tk’ui ) + (1- ε)  Tkui (5) 
with ε being the ‘culture factor’ and this inclusion of culture is carried out after 
learning (with information) is done (‘learning with culture).  
3 SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
We carried out studies on the model using computer simulations. Specifically, 10 
agents choose between 5 options. The following parameters were used: initial ran-
domness (maximum magnitude of initial random value for synapses) 0.1, creativ-
ity 0.1, culture factor 0.2 and learning rate 0.1. We studied (100 random trials) 
long-time behavior (after 1000 timesteps) of cases of no learning, self learning, 
learning with payoff, learning with information and learning with culture, each 
with zero memory, and memories of 1, 3 and 7. We investigated the mean (be-
tween agents) average (over timesteps) payoffs obtained by agents, which meas-
ures the average performance of the players, and the standard deviation (between 
agents) of the average payoffs, which gives a measure of variety of the perform-
ances. 
 
For the cases of no learning, we obtain a well-defined cluster of means of aver-
age payoff at around -0.8 and standard deviations between about 0.02 to 0.08. This 
is shown in the figure below. Learning with zero memory also yields a similar 
output, as expected. 
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Fig. 1. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of no learn-
ing and memory 0 
 
Self learning generally betters the average performances without significantly 
increasing variances. This is portrayed in the following graphs. An interesting 
thing to note is the better average performance when only immediately recent 
states are remembered. 
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Fig. 2. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of self learn-
ing and memory 1 
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Fig. 3. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of self learn-
ing and memory 3 
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Fig. 4. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of self learn-
ing and memory 7 
 
Given knowledge of resulting payoffs, agents should learn to perform better. 
This is depicted by higher means, as is evident in the following graphs. Increased 
standard deviations, reflecting emergence of variety, can also be seen, although 
with more memories, this seems to decrease. 
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Fig. 5. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of learning 
with payoff and memory 1 
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Fig. 6. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of learning 
with payoff and memory 7 
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Learning with information shows similar behavior to learning with payoff, both 
with means as well as standard deviations, almost quantitatively. 
 
Learning with culture smears the means and makes them vary substantially, but 
the standard deviations remain more or less in the band defined by no learning. 
The results of learning with culture with M=3 is shown below. Note the different 
scale for the mean. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0
mean
st
d 
de
vi
at
io
n
 
Fig. 7. Standard deviation vs mean of average cumulative payoffs for the case of learning 
with culture and memory 3 
 
In terms of strategies learnt, one (which is easy to detect) is that of holding on 
to the same option. We find that some winning agents employ this strategy, 
though employing this strategy doesn’t seem to guarantee winning all the time. 
The existence or not of less simplistic strategies requires further studies.  
4 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
We have introduced a new class of games, where payoffs are delayed. Our studies 
show how agents can learn to perform better in such games, even without outside 
information. Giving information on complete payoff vectors seem to be almost 
equivalent to also giving information on other agents’ moves. Information as such 
increases agents’ average performance as well as brings rise to increased variety. 
Heterogeneity in agents can perhaps be explained through such emergence. Cul-
ture as modeled here does not give rise to heterogeneity between agents, but does 
give rise to an array of heterogeneous overall performances. Because of culture 
agents behave similarly, but these common behaviors give rise to varied perform-
ances between trials. 
 
Evolutionary prisoners’ dilemma has brought about the surprising emergence of 
cooperation, while the minority game has shown the emergence of groups with ex-
treme behaviors [3]. Perhaps the emergence of heterogeneity can be studied using 
the game proposed in this paper. 
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